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Cloud Computing is a new emerging paradigm that aims at streamlining the on-demand provisioning of
resources as services, providing end-user with flexible and scalable services accessible through the Internet
on a pay-per-use basis. Since modern Cloud systems operate in an open and dynamic world characterized
by continuous changes, the development of efficient resource provisioning policies for Cloud-based services
becomes increasingly challenging.
This paper aims to study the hourly basis service provisioning problem through a generalized Nash game
model. We take the perspective of SaaS (Software as a Service) providers which want to minimize the
costs associated with the virtual machine instances allocated in a multi-IaaSs (Infrastructure as a Service)
scenario, while avoiding incurring in penalties for requests execution failures and providing quality of service
guarantees. SaaS providers compete and bid for the use of infrastructural resources, while the IaaSs want to
maximize their revenues obtained providing virtualized resources.
We propose a solution algorithm based on the best-reply dynamics, which is suitable for a distributed
implementation. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by performing numerical tests, considering
multiple workloads and system configurations. Results show that our algorithm is scalable and provides
significant cost savings with respect to alternative methods (5% on average but up to 260% for individual
SaaS providers). Furthermore, varying the number of IaaS providers 8–15% cost savings can be achieved
from the workload distribution on multiple IaaSs.
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1. Introduction.
Handling workloads of great diversity and enormous scale is necessary in all the most sig-
nificant fields of today society, due to the penetration of Information and Communications
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Technology (ICT) in our daily interactions with the world both at personal and community
levels, encompassing business, commerce, education, manufacturing, and communication
services. With the rapid development of computing and storage technologies, and with the
success of the Internet, computing resources have become cheaper, more powerful and more
universally available than ever before. In such a setting, dynamic systems are required
to provide services and applications that are more competitive, more scalable, and more
responsive with respect to traditional systems. This technological trend has enabled the
realization of a new computing paradigm called Cloud Computing, in which resources (e.g.,
CPU and storage) are provided as general utilities that can be leased by users through the
Internet in an on-demand fashion.
The Cloud-based services are not only restricted to software applications (Software as a
Service – SaaS ), but could also be the platform for the deployment and execution of appli-
cations developed in house (Platform as a Service – PaaS ) and the hardware infrastructure
(Infrastructure as a Service – IaaS ).
In the SaaS paradigm, applications are available over the Web and provide Quality of
Service (QoS) guarantees to end-users. SaaS providers host both the applications and the
data, hence end-users are able to use and access services from all over the world. With
PaaS, applications are developed and deployed on platforms transparently managed by the
Cloud provider. Platforms typically include databases, middleware, and also development
tools. In IaaS systems, virtual computer environments are provided as services and servers,
storage, and network equipment can be outsourced by customers without the expertise to
operate them.
Many companies are offering Cloud Computing services such as Google App Engine
(Google Compute Engine 2014), Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) (Amazon Web
Services 2014) or Microsoft Windows Azure (Microsoft Windows Azure 2014). Large data
centers provide the infrastructure behind the Cloud and virtualization technology makes
Cloud computing resources more efficient and cost-effective both for providers and cus-
tomers. Indeed, end-users obtain the benefits of the infrastructure without the need to
implement and administer it directly, adding or removing capacity almost instantaneously
on a “pay-as-you-use” basis. On the other hand, Cloud providers can maximize the uti-
lization of their physical resources also obtaining economies of scale.
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The development of efficient service provisioning policies is among the major issues
in Cloud research. Indeed, modern Cloud applications operate in an open and dynamic
world characterized by continuous changes which occur autonomously and unpredictably.
Moreover, the rapid growth of the Internet and traditional ICT problems, such as resource
allocation or QoS, pricing and load shedding, has led to a very complex interaction between
all the involved competitors.
In such context, Noncooperative Game Theory models have been successfully applied
to diverse problems such as Internet pricing, flow and congestion control, routing, and
networking (Altman et al. 2006). One of the most widely used solution concept in Game
Theory is the Nash Equilibrium (Nash 1951): a set of strategies for the players constitute
a Nash Equilibrium if no player can benefit by changing his/her strategy unilaterally or,
in other words, every player is playing a best response to the strategy choices of his/her
opponents.
Many approaches have been used to represent, model, and manage Cloud services at
run-time through Game Theory tools. In (Feng et al. 2014) authors present an in-depth
game theory study on price competition, moving progressively from a monopoly market to
a duopoly market, and finally to an oligopoly Cloud market. They characterize the nature
of noncooperative competition in a Cloud market with multiple competing Cloud service
providers, derive algorithms that represent the influence of resource capacity and operat-
ing costs on the solution and they prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium. A model
of competitive equilibrium and market dynamics in an e-commerce scenario is proposed
in (Dube et al. 2007). Here the authors analyse pricing choices and decisions to outsource
ICT systems providing a representation of the Internet competition and the solution maxi-
mizing profits. A recent survey on Cloud service pricing models is provided also in (Gohad
et al. 2013).
Studies on the maximization of the social welfare as a long-term social utility are dis-
cussed in (Menache et al. 2011). Under appropriate convexity assumptions on the operating
costs and individual utilities, the work established the existence and uniqueness of the
social optimum, considering relevant queuing aspects in a centralized setting. Furthermore,
other studies are presented in (Wan et al. 2012), where authors employ a bidding model to
solve the resource allocation problem in virtualized servers with multiple instances compet-
ing for resources. A unique equilibrium point is obtained. A similar discussion can be found
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in (Wei et al. 2010) where a QoS constrained parallel tasks resource allocation problem is
considered. In (Abhishek et al. 2012) the authors consider two simple pricing schemes for
selling Cloud instances and study the trade-off between them. Exploiting Bayesian Nash
equilibrium the authors provide theoretical and simulation based evidence suggesting that
fixed prices generate a higher expected revenue than hybrid systems. Using Bellman equa-
tions and a dynamic bidding policy in (Zafer et al. 2012), an optimal strategy under a
Markov spot price evaluation is found to serve jobs with deadline and availability con-
straints. Another work regarding on-spot bidding is proposed in (Song et al. 2012). Authors
propose a profit aware dynamic bidding algorithm, which observes the current spot price
and selects bids adaptively to maximize the average profit of a Cloud service broker while
minimizing its costs in a spot instance market.
In this paper, we take the perspective of SaaS providers which host their applications
at multiple IaaS providers. Each SaaS provider wants to minimize the cost of use of Cloud
resources and penalties for requests execution failures. The cost minimization is challenging
since on-line services receive dynamic workloads that fluctuate over multiple time scales.
Resources have to be allocated flexibly at run-time according to workload fluctuations.
Furthermore, each SaaS behaves selfishly and competes with others SaaS for the use of
infrastructural resources supplied by IaaS providers. Each IaaS, in his turn, wants to max-
imize the revenues obtained providing the resources.
To capture the behavior of SaaSs and IaaSs in this conflicting situation, in which the
best choice for one depends on the choices of the others, we recur to the Generalized Nash
Equilibrium (GNE) concept (see e.g., (Bigi et al. 2013, Cavazzuti et al. 2002, Debreu 1952,
Facchinei and Kanzow 2010a, Rosen 1965)). GNE is an extension of the Nash equilib-
rium, in which not only the objective function but also the feasible region of each player
depend on the strategies chosen by the other players. We propose a solution algorithm
based on the best-reply dynamics, which is suitable for a fully distributed implementation.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by performing numerical analyses, con-
sidering multiple workloads and system configurations, and comparing our solution with
other literature approaches. Results show that our algorithm is scalable and provides sig-
nificant cost savings with respect to alternative methods (5% on average but up to 260% for
individual SaaS providers can be obtained). Furthermore, by varying the number of IaaS
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providers we show that 8-15% cost savings can be achieved from the workload distribution
on multiple IaaSs.
In (Ardagna et al. 2011, 2013, Anselmi et al. 2013) we used the GNE concept for a
service provisioning problem where the perspective of SaaS providers hosting their appli-
cations at a single IaaS/PaaS provider is taken. Each SaaS needs to comply with end
user applications Service Level Agreement (SLA) and, at the same time, maximize its
own revenue, while minimizing the cost of use of resources supplied by the IaaS/PaaS.
On the other hand, the IaaS wants to maximize the revenues obtained providing on spot
resources. With respect to our previous works, in this paper we consider the allocation of
SaaS resources on multiple IaaS providers which is far more challenging and complex with
respect to the allocation of resources on a single Cloud. Furthermore, more realistic pricing
models are considered which lead to nonconvex feasible sets for which current literature
results cannot guarantee even the GNE existence. To the best of our knowledge, the only
work considering a multi-SaaS and multi-IaaS scenario is presented in (Roh et al. 2013),
where a resource pricing problem in geo-distributed Cloud is presented. Authors propose a
Stackelberg game-theoretic framework that is further reduced to a Rosen’s concave game.
However, more restrictive assumptions than our work are introduced and on spot resources
are not considered.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem under
study and introduces the design assumptions. In Section 3 the SaaS and IaaS problems
are formalized and the service provisioning problem is modeled as a Generalized Nash
Equilibrium Problem. Then, a distributed algorithm based on the best-reply dynamics is
provided in Section 4 in order to find a GNE which is efficient from the SaaS providers
point of view. The experimental results are discussed in Section 5. Conclusions and some
future research directions are finally drawn in Section 6.
2. Problem Statement.
Our model considers SaaS providers using Cloud Computing facilities according to the IaaS
paradigm to offer multiple transactional Web services (WSs), each service representing a
different application.
The hosted WSs can be heterogeneous with respect to resource demands, workload
intensities and QoS requirements. The set of IaaS will be indicated as I, while S will
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indicate the set of SaaSs. Si denotes the set of SaaS providers running at the IaaS provider
i and Ij the set of IaaS providers supporting SaaS j. The set of WS applications offered
by the j-th SaaS provider is denoted by Aj; the set of applications running at IaaS i is
denoted by Ai and A is the set of applications of all the SaaS providers.
An SLA contract, associated with each WS application, is established between the SaaS
provider and its end-users. We will indicate with Rk the threshold that needs to be guar-
anteed for the execution of each WS application k ∈Aj. In particular, the average response
time E [Rk] executing the WS application k has to be less or equal to the given thresh-
old Rk. Furthermore, SaaS providers implement an admission control mechanism and can
reject requests under heavy loads. According to the SLA, if the SaaS provider rejects a
request, the SLA is violated and the SaaS incurs in penalties; we will denote with νk the
penalty for rejecting a single application k request. However, in order to fix the rejection
rate above a fixed threshold and guarantee a minimum availability, SaaS j may decide to
guarantee a minimum throughput λk for any k ∈Aj.
Applications are hosted in virtual machines (VMs) which are dynamically instantiated
by the IaaS providers up to a maximum number of Ni for each IaaS i. For the sake of
simplicity, we have imposed that VMs are homogeneous providing a maximum service rate
µki for the requests of application k running at the IaaS i, but this constraint can be easily
relaxed. In the following we assume that SaaS providers host their application at multiple
IaaS providers that compete each other in the Cloud market. The interoperability among,
possibly, heterogenous technologies is guaranteed by the middleware layer developed by
the MODAClouds project (MODAClouds 2014, Ardagna et al. 2012b) which allows to
run applications concurrently on multiple Clouds increasing the availability of the whole
system. Furthermore, we make the simplifying assumption that each VM hosts a single
WS application.
IaaS providers usually charge the use of their resources on an hourly basis. Hence, the
SaaS faces the problem of determining every hour the optimal number of VMs for each
WS class in order to minimize costs and penalties. Resource allocation is performed on the
basis of a prediction of future WS workloads (Ardagna et al. 2012a, Zhu et al. 2009b) and
we will denote with Λk the prediciton of the arrival rate for WS application k for the next
time horizon. The SaaS needs also an estimate of the future performance of each VM in
order to determine application average response time. We model, as a first approximation
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and as in the other literature approaches (see, e.g., (Kumar et al. 2009, Zhang et al. 2013)),
each WS class hosted in a VM as an M/G/1 queue in tandem with a delay center (see
Figure 1). We assume (as common among Web service containers) that requests are served
according to the processor sharing scheduling discipline. As discussed in (Ardagna et al.
2013), the delay center allows to model network delays and/or protocol delays introduced
in establishing connections, etc. and it will be denoted with Dki. Performance parameters
are also continuously updated at run-time in order to capture transient behaviours, VMs
network and I/O interference and performance time of the day variability of the Cloud
provider, as in (Zhang et al. 2013).
Figure 1 System performance model.
Multiple VMs can run in parallel to support the same application. In that case, we
suppose that the workload is evenly shared among multiple instances (see Figure 2), which
is common for current Cloud solutions (Amazon Elastic Cloud 2014). However, our model
can be easily generalized to consider also heterogeneous resources relying for the load
balancing on the proportional assignment schema (Ardagna et al. 2013).
For IaaS providers we consider a pricing model similar to Amazon EC2. Each IaaS
provider offers: (i) reserved VMs, for which SaaS providers applies for a one-time payment
(currently every one or three years) for each instance they want to reserve, and (ii) on
spot VMs, for which SaaS providers bid and compete for unused IaaS capacity. We will
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Figure 2 Cloud Infrastructures.
denote with rki and ski the number of reserved and on spot instances supporting the
WS application k at IaaS i, respectively. Moreover, Rij denotes the maximum number of
reserved VMs available for SaaS j at IaaS i.
The VM instances are charged with the reserved cost ρi and on spot cost σi for each
SaaS hosted at IaaS i. These latter costs are set by the IaaS and fluctuate periodically
depending on the IaaS provider time of the day energy costs ωi and also on the supply and
demand from SaaS for on spot VM. Indeed, each SaaS provider j competes for the use of
on spot VMs specifying the maximum cost σij it is willing to pay per instance per hour
at IaaS i and the number of on spot VMs it wants to use ski for application k at IaaS i. If
IaaS i sets the on spot cost σi less or equal to the threshold σij, then the SaaS j obtains
the use of ski (≤ ski) on spot VMs that IaaS i dedicates for application k, otherwise the
IaaS decides not to allocate any on spot instance to SaaS j.
IaaS provider i has to determine every hour the time unit cost σi for on spot instances
and the number ski of on spot instances to be allocated to application k, in order to
maximize its total revenue.
On the other side, SaaS provider j has to determine every hour: the throughput xki for
the execution of the WS application k at site i; the number rki of reserved VMs supporting
the WS application k at IaaS i; the number ski of desired on spot VMs supporting the WS
application k at IaaS i; the maximum cost σij it is willing to pay for on spot VMs instances,
in order to minimize both the costs of reserved and on spot VMs and the penalties due to
request rejections.
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Since on spot resource are less reliable than reserved ones, the price σij offered by SaaS
j to IaaS i is assumed to be lower than a fraction qij ∈ (0,1) of the reserved VM cost ρi.
Moreover, in order to guarantee a minimum reliability level for every WS application, the
number of on spot VMs required by SaaS j to any IaaS provider for any WS application is
assumed to be lower than a fraction ηj ∈ (0,1) of the total number of resources requested.
Indeed, if only on spot VMs are adopted by the SaaS and they are terminated by the IaaS,
an application could become unavailable.
We assume that the SaaS decisions are taken according to some i.i.d. probabilistic law.
The resulting application execution rate (or throughput, acceptance rate) is denoted by
Xk =
∑
i∈Ij
xki for application k and is less or equal to the prediction Λk for the arrival rate of
the WS application k. If the workload is evenly shared among the VMs, then the average
response time for execution of application k requests is given by:
E [Rki] =Dki +
1
µki−
(
xki
rki+ski
) ,
under the assumption that the VMs are not saturated (i.e., the equilibrium conditions for
the M/G/1 queues hold, µki (rki + ski)−xki > 0).
For the sake of clarity, the notation adopted here is summarized in Table 1.
3. Generalized Nash Game Model.
The resource provisioning problem for the Cloud Computing system under study describes
a conflicting situation, in which the optimal choices of SaaS and IaaS providers depend
on the choices of the others. In this section we formulate this problem as a Generalized
Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP): Section 3.1 is devoted to the formulation of the SaaS
resource allocation problem, Section 3.2 contains the IaaS providers optimization problems
and the Generalized Nash equilibria of the game are defined in Section 3.3.
3.1. Game Formulation from the SaaS Side.
The problem that SaaS provider j has to periodically solve can be formulated as follows:
min
rki,ski,xki,σij
Θj =
∑
k∈Aj
∑
i∈Ij
(ρi rki +σi ski) +
∑
k∈Aj
T νk (Λk−Xk) (1)
subject to
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System Parameters
S Set of SaaS providers
I Set of IaaS providers
Si Set of SaaS providers j running applications at IaaS i
Ij Set of IaaS providers supporting SaaS j
A Set of applications of all the SaaS providers
Aj Set of applications of the SaaS provider j
Ai Set of applications running at IaaS i
Λk Prediction of the arrival rate for application k
λk Minimum arrival rate to be guaranteed for application k
µki Maximum service rate for executing class k application at IaaS i
Dki Queueing delay for executing class k application at IaaS i
Rk Application k average response time threshold
νk Penalty for rejecting a single application k request
ρi Time unit cost for reserved VMs at IaaS i
qij Maximum fraction of reserved VMs price for on spot VMs price SaaS provider j is willing to pay to IaaS i
ωi VM time unit energy cost for IaaS provider i
ηj Maximum fraction of total resources allocated as on spot VMs for SaaS provider j
Ni Maximum number of VMs that can be executed at the IaaS i
Rij Maximum number of reserved VMs that can be executed for the SaaS j at IaaS i
T Control time horizon
SaaS Decision Variables
rki Number of reserved VMs used for application k at IaaS i
ski Number of desired on spot VMs for application k at IaaS site i
xki Throughput for application k at IaaS i
Xk Overall throughput for application k
σij Time unit cost threshold for SaaS j for on spot VM instances at site i
IaaS Decision Variables
ski Number of on spot VMs used for application k at IaaS site i
σi Time unit cost offered for on spot VM instances at site i
Table 1 Parameters and decision variables.
Dki +
1
µki−
(
xki
rki+ski
) ≤Rk ∀k ∈Aj,∀i∈ Ij, (2)
∑
i∈Ij
xki =Xk ∀k ∈Aj, (3)
λk ≤Xk ≤Λk ∀k ∈Aj, (4)∑
k∈Aj
rki ≤Rij ∀i∈ Ij, (5)
ski ≤ ηj
1− ηj rki ∀k ∈Aj, ∀i∈ Ij, (6)
σij ≤ qij ρi ∀i∈ Ij, (7)
rki, ski, xki, σij ≥ 0 ∀k ∈Aj,∀i∈ Ij. (8)
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The first two terms of the payoff function represent the costs of reserved and on spot
VMs, respectively, while the third term determine the penalties incurred with request
rejections. Constraint (2) ensures that the average response time is less or equal to the
threshold Rk established in the SLA contract. Note that (2) can be equivalently rewritten
as a linear constraint in terms of variables rki and xki. Constraints (3) and (4) represent the
bounds on the throughput: the lower bound λk is needed to satisfy SLA contracts and the
upper bound Λk is the application request rate prediction. Constraint (5) entails that the
reserved VMs allocated to IaaS i are less or equal to the maximum number available Rij.
Constraint (6) is introduced for fault tolerance reasons, as explained before, and guarantees
that the number of on spot instances ski is at most a fraction ηj than the total number
rki + ski of VMs requested to IaaS i for application k. Constraint (7) sets an upper bound
for σij given by the fraction qij of the reserved VM cost ρi.
We remark that we have imposed variables ski and rki to be continuous but not integer,
as in reality they are. In fact, requiring variables to be integer could make the solution
much more difficult from the computational perspective. We therefore decide, as in several
literature approaches (see, e.g., (Ardagna et al. 2013, Zhang et al. 2012)), to deal with con-
tinuous variables, actually considering the continuous relaxation of the problem. However,
experimental results have shown that if the fractional optimal values of the variables are
rounded to the closest integer solution, the gap between the optimal value of the integer
problem and the optimal value of the relaxed one is very small. This is intuitive for large
scale data centers including thousands of servers and is a common assumption adopted in
the literature (Zhang et al. 2012).
3.2. Game Formulation from the IaaS Side.
Every IaaS provider i has to solve the following optimization problem:
max
ski,yij ,σi
Θi =
∑
k∈Ai
[(ρi−ωi) rki + (σi−ωi) ski] (9)
subject to
∑
k∈Ai
ski ≤Ni−
∑
k∈Ai
rki, (10)
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σi ≥ ωi, (11)
σi−σij ≤M (1− yij) ∀j ∈ Si, (12)
σij −σi ≤M yij ∀j ∈ Si, (13)
0≤ ski ≤ ski yij ∀j ∈ Si, ∀k ∈Aj, (14)
yij ∈ {0,1} ∀j ∈ Si. (15)
Constraint (10) entails that the total number of on spot VMs allocated to applications
is less or equal to the number of available VMs, while constraint (11) guarantees that the
on spot instance cost is at least equal to the energy cost ωi. Constraints (12)– (14) model
the dynamics between SaaS providers and IaaS i about the cost and the number of on spot
VMs. In fact, exploiting the auxiliary binary variable yij, we obtain that if IaaS i chooses
the on spot cost σi greater than σij, then it follows from (12) that yij = 0 and hence ski = 0
for all WS applications k ∈Aj, that is IaaS decides not to allocate any on spot instance to
SaaS j. On the other hand, if σi < σij, then (13) implies that yij = 1 and hence ski ≤ ski,
i.e., the SaaS j obtains the use of ski on spot VMs which is less or equal to the required
number ski.
The IaaS optimization problem stated above is a Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming
problem, in which the objective function is neither convex nor concave (because it contains
the products σi ski), thus it is very challenging from a computational point of view. How-
ever, we now show that its special structure allows to develop a simple ad-hoc algorithm
for finding a global optimal solution.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the on spot prices σij offered by the SaaS
providers are decreasingly ordered, i.e., σi1 > σi2 > · · · > σi|Si|. The idea of the solution
algorithm is based on the following argument: if IaaS chooses σi >σi1, then its revenue is
null; if σi = σi1, then it offers on spot VMs only to the first SaaS, obtaining the revenueR1 =
σi1
∑
k∈A1 ski (provided that the number of on spot VMs available is at least
∑
k∈A1 ski);
if IaaS sets σi ∈ (σi2, σi1), then it offers again on spot VMs only to the first SaaS, but its
revenue is σi1
∑
k∈A1 ski which is lower than R1. Next, if the IaaS reduces σi to σi2, this
time it gains R2 = σi2
∑
k∈A1∪A2 ski; if it sets σi ∈ (σi3, σi2), then again this choice is not
convenient since the revenue is lower than R2, and so on. Therefore, the optimal price σi
must be equal to one of the on spot prices σij offered by the SaaS providers and it can be
obtained by iterating this process until there are no more VMs available according to the
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capacity constraint (10). The complete method to obtain the global optimum solution of
IaaS problem is reported in Algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1: solving the IaaS i optimization problem.
1 Sort σij in decreasing order: σi1 >σi2 > · · ·>σi|Si|
2 Si =Ni−
∑
k∈Ai
rki
3 σi =∞, Ri = 0, t= 1
4 s= min
{
Si,
∑
1≤j≤t
∑
k∈Aj
ski
}
, R= σit s
5 if R>Ri then
6 σi = σit, Ri =R
7 if (s < Si and t < |Si|) then
8 t= t+ 1, go to step 4
9 for j ∈ Si do
10 if σij ≥ σi then
11 yij = 1
12 for k ∈Aj do
13 ski = min{ski, Si}, Si = Si− ski
14 else
15 yij = 0
16 ski = 0 ∀ k ∈Aj
The algorithm starts sorting the prices σij offered by the SaaSs and determines the
number Si of on spot VMs that the IaaS i can offer (steps 1 and 2). During the execution
of the algorithm σi represents the current best price for the IaaS, Ri the corresponding
revenue and t is an index to iterate among SaaSs. These three values are initialized in
step 3. Steps 4–8 find the optimal cost σi. The IaaS determines if there is enough capacity
to provide to the first t SaaSs the on spot VMs at the price σit offered by the SaaS t.
The maximum number s of on spot VMs that the IaaS can sell to the first t SaaSs is the
minimum between the available capacity Si and the total number of on spot VMs requested
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by the first t SaaSs, that is
∑
1≤j≤t
∑
k∈Aj
ski. The corresponding revenue is R= σit st (step 4).
Then, in steps 5 and 6 σi and Ri are updated accordingly. Steps 4–6 are iterated until
either all of the SaaSs have been considered, i.e., t= |Si|, or the IaaS capacity is saturated
s= Si. The optimal values of yij and ski are assigned in steps 9–16 according to the price
offered by SaaS providers and their WS applications requirements.
Notice that the time complexity of Algorithm 3.1 is O (max{|Si| log(|Si|), |Ai|}), due to
the sorting at step 1 and the assignment of ski at step 13.
3.3. Generalized Nash Equilibria.
In this framework, SaaS providers and the IaaS providers are taking decisions at the same
time. The objective function of each SaaS (IaaS) depends on the variables of the IaaSs
(SaaSs). Moreover, the strategy set each SaaS (IaaS) depends on the variables of the IaaSs
(SaaSs). In this setting, we can not analyse decision in isolation, but we must ask what a
SaaS would do, taking into account the decision of the IaaSs and other SaaSs. To capture
the behavior of SaaSs and IaaSs in this conflicting situation (game) in which what a SaaS
or a IaaS (the players of the game) does directly affects what others do, we consider the
Generalized Nash game, which is broadly used in Game Theory and other fields. We remind
the reader that the GNEP differs from the classical Nash Equilibrium Problem since, not
only the objective function of each player depends upon the strategies chosen by all the
other players, but also the strategy set of each player may depend on the rival players’
strategies.
The service provisioning problem results in a GNEP where the strategies of SaaS j
are xj = (xki)k∈Aj ,i∈Ij , rj = (rki)k∈Aj ,i∈Ij , σj = (σij)i∈Ij and sj = (ski)k∈Aj ,i∈Ij , while the
strategies of IaaS i are si = (ski)k∈Ai , yi = (yij)j∈Si and σi.
In this setting, a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) is a set of strategies such that no
player can improve its payoff function by changing its strategy unilaterally (Facchinei and
Kanzow 2010a), i.e., a GNE is a vector (r∗, x∗, σ∗, s∗, s∗, y∗, σ∗) such that constraints (2)–(8)
and (10)–(15) are satisfied, for any j ∈ S we have
Θj(r
∗
j , x
∗
j , s
∗, σ∗)≤Θj(rj, xj, s∗, σ∗), ∀ (rj, xj) satisfying constraints (2)–(8), (16)
and for all i∈ I we have
Θi(r
∗, s∗i , σ
∗
i )≥Θi(r∗, si, σi), ∀ (si, σi) satisfying constraints (10)–(15). (17)
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4. Solution Algorithm.
In the last years, several algorithms for solving GNEPs have been proposed in the lit-
erature (Facchinei and Kanzow 2010b, von Heusinger and Kanzow 2009, von Heusinger
et al. 2012, Nabetani et al. 2011, Pang and Fukushima 2005, Panicucci et al. 2009). All
these approaches can be applied to GNEPs in which each player has to solve a convex
optimization problem. Moreover, most of them solves GNEPs with shared constraints.
Unfortunately, the GNEP stated in the previous section does not meet any of the two
conditions. In fact, the IaaSs optimization problems are not convex since involve binary
variables yij and the constraints of each player are not shared with all the other players.
Therefore, the GNEP considered in this paper is very challenging to solve. In this section,
we propose an ad-hoc algorithm based on the best-reply dynamics, which is suitable for a
distributed implementation, in order to find a GNE. The complete procedure is reported
in Algorithm 4.1.
Steps 1–10 initialize the values of SaaSs and IaaSs variables. The algorithm starts (step
1) choosing, for any IaaS i, the on spot price σi as 10% higher than the energy costs ωi.
Next, each SaaS j computes the optimal value of reserved and on spot resources considering
the ideal scenario in which the overall Cloud system workload is light and all the necessary
resources can be obtained from IaaSs (step 3). In other words, in the ideal scenario we
assume that ski = ski for each WS application k ∈ Aj and each IaaS i ∈ Ij, and there is
no SaaSs competition on the on spot prices. The problem of SaaS j in the ideal scenario,
denoted by IdealSaaS[j], can be formulated as follows:
min
rki,ski,xki
∑
k∈Aj
∑
i∈Ij
(ρi rki +σi ski) +
∑
k∈Aj
T νk (Λk−Xk) (18)
subject to
Dki +
1
µki−
(
xki
rki+ski
) ≤Rk ∀k ∈Aj,∀i∈ Ij, (19)
∑
i∈Ij
xki =Xk ∀k ∈Aj, (20)
λk ≤Xk ≤Λk ∀k ∈Aj, (21)
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Algorithm 4.1: Solution algorithm
1 σi = 1.1ωi, ∀ i∈ I
2 for j ∈ S do
3 Solve IdealSaaS[j]
4 σij = min{σi, qij ρi} , ∀ i∈ Ij
5 for i∈ I do
6 for j ∈ Si s.t. σij <σi do
7 ski = 0, ∀ k ∈Aj
8 Stoti =
∑
j∈Si
s.t. σij=σi
∑
k∈Aj
ski
9 for j ∈ Si s.t. σij = σi do
10 ski = ski min
1,
Ni−
∑
k∈Ai
rki
Stoti
 , ∀ k ∈Aj
11 continue = 0
12 for j ∈ S do
13 solve SaaS[j]
14 if (problem is unfeasible) and (∃ i∈ Ij s.t. σij ≤ σi < qij ρi) then
15 solve IdealSaas[j]
16 for i∈ Ij s.t. σij ≤ σi < qij ρi do
17 σij = min{1.01σi, qij ρi}
18 continue = 1
19 else
20 if (∃ k ∈Aj s.t. Xk <Λk) and (∃ i∈ Ij s.t. σij ≤ σi < qij ρi) then
21 for i∈ Ij s.t. σij ≤ σi < qij ρi do
22 σij = min{1.01σi, qij ρi}
23 continue = 1
24 for i∈ I do
25 solve IaaS[i]
26 if continue= 1 then
27 go to step 11
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k∈Aj
rki ≤Rij ∀i∈ Ij, (22)
rki, ski, xki ≥ 0 ∀k ∈Aj,∀i∈ Ij. (23)
Moreover, each SaaS j sets the on spot price thresholds σij as the minimum between σi
set by IaaSs and the fraction qij of reserved price ρi (step 4). Then, each IaaS i assigns the
on spot resources to SaaSs: it decides not to allocate any on spot instance to each SaaS j
such that the on spot price thresholds σij is less than the on spot price σi (steps 6-7). It
computes the total number Stoti of on spot VMs required by SaaSs j with σij = σi (step
8); if Stoti is less or equal to the total number of available on spot VMs, i.e., Ni−
∑
k∈Ai
rki,
then it assigns ski = ski for all k ∈Aj; otherwise ski are rescaled proportionally to the ratio(
Ni−
∑
k∈Ai
rki
)
/Stoti (step 10).
Subsequently, the best reply dynamics starts. Each SaaS j solves its own problem
SaaS[j]; if this problem is unfeasible, i.e., SaaS j cannot guarantee the minimum through-
put λk for some k ∈Aj, and there exists at least a IaaS from which it could obtain more on
spot resources, then it solves the problem in the ideal scenario (step 15) and it increases
the on spot price threshold σij up to 1% higher than the on spot price σi, provided that
it is below the bound qij ρi (steps 15-17). This increase of σij is performed also in the case
some workload is rejected for some class k ∈ Aj, i.e., Xk < Λk (steps 20-22). We adopt
the flag continue to indicate that some SaaS has increased the on spot price threshold
σij and it needs to play again. Next, each IaaS solves its own problem IaaS[i] (steps
24-25). If the flag continue is equal to 1, then all the players need to solve again their
problems, otherwise the strategies of each player are the best response to the ones of the
other players, that is a GNE is obtained.
Note that, Algorithm 4.1 is suitable of a fully distributed implementation: The SaaS
providers initially send to the IaaSs their bid σij and the values of reserved and desired
on-spot resources, i.e., rik and sik obtained solving the ideal scenario problem at step
3. Then, the IaaS providers sends back to individual SaaSs the the number of on-spot
VMs available sik (steps 5-10). Then, the best reply procedure starts an messages are
exchanged by SaaS providers increasing their bids and IaaS providers. As a final remark,
note that Algorithm 4.1 does not require to share the information on the SLA contracts
and performance parameters (i.e., Rk, λk, etc.) among SaaSs and IaaSs.
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5. Experimental Results.
The proposed solution has been evaluated for a variety of systems and workload config-
urations. Tests have been performed on a VirtualBox virtual machine based on Ubuntu
12.04 server running on an Intel Xeon Nehalem dual socket quad-core system with 32 GB
of RAM. CPLEX 12.2.0.0 has been used as MILP solver (IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimizer
2014). Section 5.1 describes the design of experiments. Scalability is discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2, while Section 5.3 is devoted to quantitatively analyze the efficiency of the equilibria
with respect to other approaches proposed in the literature and currently implemeted by
Cloud providers. Finally, Section 5.4 illustrates how the SaaSs solution changes by varying
the number of target IaaSs, demonstrating cost savings from multi-Cloud adoption.
5.1. Design of Experiments.
The proposed approach has been evaluated by considering a very large set of randomly
generated instances. The performance parameters of the applications and infrastructural
resource costs have been randomly generated uniformly in the ranges reported in Table 2
as in other literature approaches (Anselmi and Verloop 2011, Ardagna et al. 2012c, Kusic
et al. 2008), considering also real applications (Ardagna et al. 2013) and according to com-
mercial fees applied by IaaS/PaaS Cloud providers (Amazon Elastic Cloud 2014, Microsoft
Windows Azure Virtual Machines 2014).
The upper bounds Rk on the average response time were set proportional to the request
service demand 1/µki, i.e., for every SaaS j and application k ∈Aj,
Rk = γk min
i∈Ij
1
µki
,
where γk has been randomly generated uniformly in the range [5, 40], as in (Ardagna and
Pernici 2007). Since request rejection has an important impact on SaaS provider reputation,
we set λk = 0.8 Λk.
Moreover, we analysed the solutions behavior by varying also the ratio of the reserved
instances with respect to the total IaaSs resources. In particular, we define the proportion
of the available reserved VMs on the total resources offered by IaaS i as
φi =
∑
j∈Si
Rij
Ni
. (24)
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Ni [1000, 2000] VMs Rij [100, 200] VMs
Dki [0.001, 0.05] s Rk [0.025, 0.1] s
µki [200, 400] req/s ηj [0.25, 0.75]
Λk [1, 250] req/s λk [0.8, 200] req/s
ρi [0.048, 0.076] $/h ωi [0.005, 0.01] $/h
Table 2 Performance parameters and time unit costs.
Our evaluation is conducted by setting, for all i, φi = 0.6 and φi = 0.7 (i.e., the SaaSs
can rely on the reserved VMs for 60 % or 70% of the total IaaS resources). Unfortunately,
the data on IaaSs trade policies, i.e., φi parameters, are not public available.
The number of SaaS providers has been varied between 100 and 500, the number of
applications (evenly shared among SaaSs) between 1,000 and 5,0001. The number of IaaSs
is smaller compared to SaaSs and it is fixed to 10. This reflects the current business offer.
We considered scenarios in which every SaaS relies on three IaaSs at most. All the results
reported in the next sections are average values that have been computed on 40 different
instances of the same size for every configuration of the Cloud system.
5.2. Scalability Analysis.
Scalability results are reported in Table 3 which shows the average execution time and
the average number of iterations performed by the best reply procedure (steps 12-27 of
Algorithm 4.1), under the assumption that SaaS problems are solved in parallel (i.e., a
distributed implementation is adopted). We considered the worst case scenario where the
cardinality of the IaaSs set is fixed at |I|= 10 and the SaaS to IaaS mapping set cardinality
is |Ij|= 3 for all j ∈ S.
The execution time of Algorithm 4.1 increases with the problem instance size, however
the average execution time is always below 5 seconds. Since in real Cloud systems, the
run-time resource allocation is performed periodically on a hourly basis (see, e.g., (Almeida
et al. 2010, Armbrust et al. 2009, Birke et al. 2012)), we can state that the proposed method
is very efficient and our solution is suitable to determine the resource provisioning of very
large Cloud infrastructures compatibly with the problem time scales, without introducing
any system overhead.
1 We have verified that the performance of Algorithm 4.1 is not affected by the applications to SaaSs assignment
cardinality (we varied the number of applications per SaaS in the range 1-100). Results are omitted for space limitation.
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( |S|, |A| ) Time (s) Iterations
(100, 1000) 0.362 4.7
(200, 2000) 0.738 2.7
(300, 3000) 1.010 5.0
(400, 4000) 1.662 2.3
(500, 5000) 4.252 2.7
Table 3 Average execution times and average number of best reply iterations of Algorithm 4.1
5.3. Equilibria efficiency
Since the considered problem can admit multiple equilibria, it is worth analyzing the effi-
ciency of the equilibrium found by Algorithm 4.1. In order to evaluate the quality of
our approach, we have implemented a different version of Algorithm 4.1, called Alterna-
tive Algorithm, characterized by a different choice of the initial solution. For each SaaS,
the initial number of reserved and desired on spot VMs is determined according to the
utilization principle, i.e., the number of VM instances at step 3 is computed such that
the average utilization of all VMs, i.e., xki/[µki(rki + ski)], is equal to U . Threshold-based
approaches have been widely used in the literature (see, e.g., (Wolke and Meixner 2010,
Zhu et al. 2009a)) and are also advocated by IaaS providers. For example, Amazon Elas-
tic Beanstalk (Amazon Inc. 2014) provides a basic mechanism to trigger the start-up or
termination of VM instances according to the threshold values, which can be specified by
SaaS providers accessing the Amazon EC2 API.
In particular, the Alternative Algorithm replaces step 3 of Algorithm 4.1 with the fol-
lowing steps:
for i∈ Ij do
3a. xki =
Λk
|Ij | , ∀ k ∈Aj
3b. rki =
xki
µkiU
, ∀ k ∈Aj
3c. R̂ij =
∑
k∈Aj
rki
3d. if R̂ij >Rij then rki = rki
Rij
R̂ij
, ∀ k ∈Aj
3e. ski =
xki
µkiU
− rki, ∀ k ∈Aj
In other words, all the incoming workload is served and it is evenly shared among avail-
able IaaS (step 3a). Then, the Alternative Algorithm tries to use only reserved instances
and determines its number according to the utilization threshold (step 3b). If reserved
Passacantando, Ardagna, Savi: Service Provisioning Problem in Cloud and multi-Cloud Systems
Article submitted to INFORMS Journal on Computing; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!) 21
resources are not sufficient (step 3d), reserved instances are rescaled and the number of
desired on spot instances is computed (step 3e). As in (Ardagna et al. 2012a, Zhu et al.
2009a), we set U = 0.6.
We considered three different metrics to evaluate the efficiency of the two algorithms:
OFRtot =
∑
j∈S
Θj
(
GNEAlg. 4.1
)
∑
j∈S
Θj (GNEAlternative Alg.)
,
OFRmin = min
j∈S
Θj
(
GNEAlg. 4.1
)
Θj (GNEAlternative Alg.)
,
OFRmax = max
j∈S
Θj
(
GNEAlg. 4.1
)
Θj (GNEAlternative Alg.)
.
OFRtot is the objective funcion ratio (OFR) between the total SaaS cost at the equi-
librium found by Algorithm 4.1 (GNEAlg. 4.1) and the total SaaS cost at the equilibrium
found by the Alternative Algorithm (GNEAlternative Alg.), while OFRmin and OFRmax are
the minimum and maximum ratio between the individual SaaS cost at GNEAlg. 4.1 and
the individual SaaS cost at GNEAlternative Alg., respectively. Values lower than 1 indicate
that Algorithm 4.1 provides better performance.
|S| OFRtot OFRmin OFRmax % better
100 0.9402 0.3923 1.0 11.12
200 0.9592 0.5202 1.0 7.69
300 0.9585 0.3940 1.0 7.08
400 0.9437 0.3826 1.0 9.00
500 0.9445 0.4843 1.0 8.48
Table 4 Alternative Algorithm Comparison
Results in Table 4 show that, on average Algorithm 4.1 provides solutions better than 5%
of the alternative one. If the individual SaaS are considered, OFRmin ratio ranges between
38% and 52%, that is in the worst case the Alternative Algorithm provides a solution
worst than 192–261%, while Algorithm 4.1 always performs at least as the Alternative one
(OFRmax is always equal to 1). The last column of Table 4 reports the percentage value of
the number of SaaS providers such that Algorithm 4.1 performs better than the alternative
one, i.e., Θj
(
GNEAlg. 4.1
)
<Θj
(
GNEAlternative Alg.
)
.
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5.4. Multiple IaaS Analysis.
In this Section we consider SaaS providers relying on one or more IaaS providers to host
their applications in order to highlight the benefits of the adoption of multi-IaaS solutions.
In particular for every SaaS j, the number of target IaaSs |Ij| has been varied between 1
and 3.
To perform a fair comparison, the total number of reserved VMs available is always the
same both in the single IaaS case and in the multi-IaaS scenario. Problem instances have
been randomly generated such that
∑
i∈Ij , |Ij |=1
Rij =
∑
i∈Ij , |Ij |=2
Rij =
∑
i∈Ij , |Ij |=3
Rij, ∀j ∈ S,
where also the arrival rates Λk are fixed. Results are shown in Table 5, average Θj values
are expressed in $.
φi |Ij|= 1 |Ij|= 2 |Ij|= 3
0.6 15.5489 14.2971 13.1112
0.7 16.2184 14.5385 14.2297
Table 5 Average Θj value ($) for Multi-IaaS adoption.
The average Θj value decreases as the cardinality of Ij increases both for φ= 0.6 and
φ = 0.7, suggesting an effective advantage of having more IaaS providers from the SaaS
point of view. Using two IaaS, savings range in 8–10%, while adopting three IaaS providers
saving grow up to 12–15% with respect to the single IaaS scenario.
This could be expected, since with multiple IaaS providers when resources offered by a
IaaS are saturated, SaaSs can start VMs into another IaaS provider without incurring in
penalties for request rejections. Moreover, with the possibility of allocating resources in
more than one IaaS, SaaSs can compete for the cheapest resources on multiple providers,
in order to reduce their fees. Indeed, a SaaS can bid for lowest on spot price resources,
decreasing its cost thresholds σij according to the different prices σi.
Finally, we computed the average on spot prices σi fixed by IaaSs for the three cases:
values are reported in Table 6.
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φi |Ij|= 1 |Ij|= 2 |Ij|= 3
0.6 0.7346 0.7490 0.7515
0.7 0.7362 0.7226 0.7463
Table 6 Average on spot prices σi ($)
Results do not vary significantly. Since the number of reserved instances is the same
across different scenarios, we can argue that the SaaSs savings are due to the fact that
SaaSs can access resources from the cheapest provider.
In conclusion, our analysis demonstrates that using simultaneously multiple IaaS
providers allows both to improve the availability for the SaaS end-users and to achieve
economic benefits.
6. Conclusions.
In this paper, we considered the problem of run-time management of IaaSs provider capac-
ities among multiple competing SaaSs through the formulation and study of a GNE model.
We took the perspective of SaaS providers whose goal is the minimization of the costs
associated with the virtual machine instances allocated on multiple IaaSs, while guar-
anteeing QoS constraints. On the other side, each IaaS provider aims at maximizing its
revenues. The cost model includes SaaS revenues and penalties incurred for request rejec-
tions and infrastructural costs associated with IaaSs resources. Current on spot pricing
models adopted by IaaS providers are considered, which lead to a nonconvex generalized
game for which current literature results cannot guarantee even the equilibrium existence.
We proposed a solution technique based on the best reply dynamic and evaluated the
effectiveness of our approach, performing a wide set of analyses which considered multiple
workloads and system configurations. Scalability analysis have shown that systems up to
thousands of applications can be managed very efficiently in a fully distributed manner.
Since the computation times required to solve problem instances of maximum size were
around 5 seconds, we can state that the execution time is compatible with the time scales
characterizing the service provisioning problem, without introducing any system overhead.
When compared with an alternative method inspired by other literature solutions and
currently implemented by IaaS providers, significant cost savings can be achieved (5% on
average, up to 260% for individual SaaS providers). Furthermore, we have shown that
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varying the number of IaaS providers 8-15% cost savings can be achieved from the workload
distribution on multiple IaaSs.
Future work will be devoted to a deeper investigation of the time scales which can
be adopted to govern the behavior of Cloud systems, performing resource allocation also
every few minutes. Furthermore, on demand resources will be included in the game model
formulation.
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